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Comment: Carmen M. Reinhart 
 
This chapter makes a compelling case that the Korean financial crisis of 
1997 was not the consequence of a misaligned exchange rate and external 
imbalance, nor was it the classic first-generation credit-financed fiscal 
deficit stressed by Krugman (1979). The authors also cast doubt on explanations 
of the Korean crisis that rely exclusively on a liquiditycrisis/ 
banking panic story, as in Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), or on earlier 
models with self-fulfilling expectations (see, for instance, Obstfeld, 
1994). Instead, they argue that the Korean banking and currency crises 
had their origins in the financial liberalization that took place in the 
earlier part of the 1990s.Financial liberalization, coupled with explicit or 
implicit government guarantees, fueled a surge in capital inflows that 
were largely intermediated through Korean banks. Owing to (in part) 
increased competition, the banks saw their franchise value erode, took 








A central theme of the chapter, as the title suggests, is that the 
financialliberalizationl Dooley (2000) insurance explanations of the crisis offer testable 
predictions as to what the antecedents of the crisis should be - particularly 
as to the nature of capital flows and bank lending - and that these 
predictions accord well with the Korean stylized facts. 
I will divide my remarks into three parts. First, I will elaborate on 
some of the points made in the chapter, as to why financial liberalization 
and moral hazard have played a very important role in explaining the 
antecedents of the twin crises - in Korea and elsewhere. I will also refer 
to a variety of "stylized facts" that, over and beyond the Korean episode, 
fit well with the insurance/capital inflow story. Second, I will focus on two 
types of macroeconomic policies that significantly influenced the volume 
and composition of Korean capital inflows prior to the crisis which are 
not discussed in the chapter. Lastly, I will argue that the authors dismiss 
too lightly explanations of the Korean crisis that are offered by variants 
of the earlier first- and second-generation currency crises models. When 
confronting competing models with the data, serious observational 
equivalence problems arise, making it difficult to pin down "the model" 
- as the authors suggest. 
In my earlier work on capital flow cycles, I once compared the surge 
in capital inflows to emerging markets that took place in the early 1990s 
with the flows of the late 1970s-early 1980s (see Calvo, Leiderman, 
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and Reinhart, 1994). A striking difference between the two episodes 
appeared to be that in the 1990s it was the private sector who was borrowing 
from abroad, while in the 1980s it was the governments. Of 
course, the external debt data I was analyzing reflected the state of affairs 
after the debt crisis; when someone suggested that I look at the distributionof 
public and private external debt as it stood before the crisis, it 
became very evident that an important reason why governments held 
the lion's share of external debt ex post was that they had assumed much 
of what was private sector debt ex ante. Given such antecedents, and the 
scores of bailouts of collapsing banking systems around the globe, it is 
not difficult to see why implicit guarantees would give rise to indiscriminate 
borrowing by Korean banks and firms and equally reckless lending 
- this time, by the Japanese and European banks. In the case of Korea, 
at least, expectations of a government guarantee expost turned out to be 
well-justified. Korea, however, is not unique in this regard. 
The insurance model predicts booming credit growth financed by 
capital inflows prior to the crisis. It also predicts that the maturity of 
those inflows would shorten as the crisis nears - not surprisingly, as the 
crisis is fully anticipated. Because there is insurance, the model also suggests 
that interest rates need not rise on the eve of the crisis. The initial 
trigger factor for the inflows of capital could be a financial liberalization, 
a decline in international interest rates, or both of these. Indeed, above 
and beyond the evidence presented in the analysis for the Korean case, 
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there is much broader empirical evidence to support all these stylized 
facts - even the more surprising prediction about interest rates (see 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
I also share the authors' assessment of the importance of the pullout 
of Japanese creditor banks in explaining the sudden and massive 
capital outflows from Korea toward the end of 1997. Indeed, in a recent 
chapter of mine with Graciela Kaminsky we present evidence that a 
powerful channel of contagion during the Asian crisis came from the 
behavior of Japanese banks after they suffered initial losses in Thailand, 
where they had their greatest exposure (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
2000). 
Above and beyond the motives discussed in the chapter, however, 
there are two key reasons why Korea experienced a surge in capital 
inflows and why an increasing share of those inflows were tilted toward 
very short maturities. The first of these reasons had to do with how the 
authorities responded to the initial surge in capital inflows. In Korea, as 
in many other emerging markets, there was a marked reluctance to allow 
the currency to appreciate during the capital inflow phase of the cycle. 
The authorities dealt with pressures on the currency by intervening 
in the foreign exchange market and accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves. The Korean monetary authorities were also concerned, 
however, that unsterilized intervention would lead to a rapid expansion 
in the monetary aggregates and fuel overheating and inflationary pressures. 
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The solution they found to this dilemma was sterilized intervention. 
However, persistent sterilization policies kept domestic short-term 
interest rates well above international levels for a prolonged period of 
time. The banks responded to this differential in rates of return by borrowing 
offshore at short maturities. Indeed, this outcome was also not 
unique to Korea; Montiel and Reinhart (1999), who study a panel of 
fifteen emerging markets in the 1990s, show that sterilized intervention 
significantly increases the volume of capital inflows. Furthermore, this 
policy skews their maturities toward the short end of the spectrum. As 
the paper notes, all this short-term borrowing set the stage for the 
December banking panic, as Japanese and European creditors pulled 
out. This "policy inconsistency" is yet another complement to the insurance 
story/botched liberalization story. 
he second reason why such a trivial share of the borrowing was 
long term had to do with how the liberalization proceeded. While 
some countries, such as Chile and Colombia, introduced impediments 
or disincentives to external short-term borrowing - even as they continued 
to liberalize - in Korea the opposite was true. Barriers to short-term 
offshore borrowing were significantly reduced, while impediments to 
equity investment and other types of long-term finance remained in 
place. 
Lastly, however, I do not share the authors' assessment of the uselessness 
of first- and second-generation models of currency crises in 
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providing useful insights into the Korean crisis. Consider, first, the 
Krugman (1979) explanation. Surely, a fiscal deficit was not a problem 
for Korea - that was not the source of the policy inconsistency. Yet, a 
very simple variation of Krugman's story fits Korea and some of the 
other recent twin crises rather well. It is not the government who needs 
credit from the central bank - it is the ailing financial institutions. The 
central bank's usual willingness to support the banks (as it did in Korea) 
creates the policy inconsistency. Being lender of last resort requires 
credit creation, which is, of course, incompatible with maintaining the 
exchange rate. 
Turning to a second-generation setting, we can entertain a very plausible 
reinterpretation of the Obstfeld (1996) explanations for shifts in 
investor sentiment that are highly pertinent for Korea. In the Obstfeld 
stories, investors know that the authorities will be reluctant to raise interest 
rates to defend the currency for one reason or another. In his examples, 
the authorities are concerned about the consequences of high 
interest rates for unemployment or the implications for the burden of 
servicing the public sector debt. To fit Korea, only a moderate adjustment 
is needed. Although a high stock of public sector debt was not an 
issue, the private sector was highly leveraged. If, as this chapter suggests, 
private sector debt is a contingent liability of the government, then the 
Obstfeld debt story is still applicable - except in a slightly disguised form. 
Furthermore, even without considerations about debt, the authorities 
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may feel constrained in hiking interest rates because of the weak state 
of the banks. If investors know this, then we have the prerequisites for a 
self-fulfilling speculative attack in place. 
In the end, I am still compelled to conclude, Will the "real model" 
please stand up? 
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